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THE PREDICTABILITY OF JURIESt
Valerie P. Hans*
Theodore Eisenberg**
The jury is said to be the least predictable of the decision makers in
the legal system. Indeed, the uncertainty many observers feel when
faced with an imminent jury decision is the stuff of dramatic tension.
Countless movies and television shows about the courtroom feature
the breathless moments between the trial judge asking whether the
jury has reached a verdict, the foreman rising slowly and stating, "Yes,
Your Honor, we have a verdict," and the foreman pronouncing the
verdict to the hushed courtroom, which erupts in either jubilation or
rage.'
The unpredictability of juries is reportedly the bane of many liti-
gators, who must attempt to anticipate the future reactions of a group
of laypersons. 2 The uncertainties of jury responses to potential cases
produce pressures to drop or settle cases or to reach high-low agree-
ments in the face of the unknown. Lawyers' decisions about what
cases to take or reject are based on their guesses and predictions of
what a jury might do and thus on estimates of uncertain value. Per-
haps as a result, the unpredictability of juries has been a boon to the
trial-consulting industry. Many jury consultants emphasize the ways
t An early version of this Article was presented at the Sixteenth Annual Clifford Symposium
on Tort Law and Social Policy, The Limits of Predictability and the Value of Uncertainty, on
April 8, 2010, at DePaul University College of Law in Chicago, Illinois. We thank Professor
Stephan Landsman and Neil Vidmar for their helpful comments. The NCSC-BJS Study data
analyzed here were gathered under a grant from the Bureau of Justice Statistics and are archived
at the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, Civil Justice Survey of State
Courts, 2005, Study No. 23862. The views expressed here are those of the authors and not those
of either the National Center for State Courts or the Bureau of Justice Statistics.
* Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School; Fellow, Cornell University Institute for
the Social Sciences, 2009-2012.
** Henry Allen Mark Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor of Statistical Sciences, Cornell
University.
1. See generally Carol J. Clover, Movie Juries, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 389 (1998); Valerie P. Hans
& Juliet L. Dee, Media Coverage of Law: Its Impact on Juries and the Public, 35 AM. BE[ IAV.
Scli'rrTST 136 (1991).
2. See generally Jonas Jacobson et al., Predicting Civil Jury Verdicts: How Attorneys Use (and
Misuse) a Second Opinion, J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STuD. (forthcoming 2011).
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in which their insights and methods offer the ability to predict jury
trial outcomes.3
In this Article, we first reflect on what it means to say that juries are
"unpredictable." Next, we consider research about jury functioning to
assess whether the common claims about unpredictable juries are
borne out. Finally, we analyze the factors that are associated with per-
ceptions of the unpredictability of civil juries by combining selected
data from two different research projects: one that assesses corporate
and insurance attorneys' views of the civil justice system, and one that
analyzes civil jury trials in state courts.
II. WHAT DOES JURY UNPREDICTABILITY MEAN?
First, we consider the diverse possible interpretations of the uncer-
tainty or unpredictability of juries as legal decision makers. In addi-
tion, we reflect on what elements and features of jury decision making
might lead to more or less certainty and predictability. A preliminary
point about the purported unpredictability of juries is that we must
place juries and jury trials within the broader context of the civil jus-
tice system. Only a small fraction of cases go to trial and are heard by
juries.4 Theorizing about what cases settle and what cases go to trial,
many scholars conclude that the large majority of cases with clear out-
comes will settle, leaving the most ambiguous cases for trial.5 This
subset of ambiguous cases is the group of cases that juries decide. The
outcomes of these cases might be difficult to predict, no matter who
decides them. Before the trial, some uncertainty about a case's even-
tual outcome will be present regardless of which decision maker is
used. In addition to the ambiguity of the cases selected for trial, it is
not always clear how the trial evidence will develop and how witnesses
will communicate their stories.
Juries are often contrasted with judges, and reasonably so, because
judges are the most plausible alternative to juries. The judge decides
alone, whereas the jury has the benefit of combining multiple insights
3. See Jo-ELLAN DIMITRIUS & MARK MAZZARELLA, READING PEOPLE: How [o UNDER-
STAND PEOPLE AND PRIEDIcr TiEiiR BEiIAVIOR-ANYTIME, ANYPLACE, at xii (1999); Nei J.
KRESSEL & Dourr F. KRESSEL, STACK AND) SWAY: TiE NEW SCINCI OF1 JURY CONSULInfNG 14
(2002); AMY J. POSEY & LAWRENCE S. WRIGIITSMAN, TRIAL CONSULI rNG 19 (2005).
4. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in
Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL Swuo. 459, 460 (2004).
5. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg, Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework
with Empirical Tests, 19 J. LEGAL STuD. 337, 337 (1990); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud,
Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MiciI.
L. REV. 319, 323 (1991); George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Liti-
gation, 13 J. LEGAL STuD. 1, 17 (1984).
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into a group verdict. A host of studies comparing individual and
group decision making finds that groups offer more stable and more
accurate estimates of a population's preferences. 6 Even so, observers
might well consider judicial decisions to be more predictable than de-
cisions by juries. After the case assignment and sometimes even
before, the identity of the judge who will preside over a trial is known.
The judge's previous history, rulings in similar cases, and prior rela-
tionships and experiences all offer some information (whether it is
useful or not) about how the judge might decide an upcoming case.
None of that is known for certain before a jury trial. Even if the gen-
eral tendencies of a jury pool are known through a lawyer's or liti-
gant's prior experiences or a trial consultant's systematic information,
the identity of the individual jurors will only be determined at the
start of the trial during the jury-selection process. To the extent that
individual characteristics influence decisions, one should be better
able to predict a judge's verdict than a jury's.
Another source of the greater perceived unpredictability of juries
compared to judges is that jurors are widely presumed to rely on their
intuitions, personal biases, and values. In contrast, judicial decision
making is said to be characterized by a rational approach.7 However,
judges are subject to many of the same psychological tendencies that
influence laypeople.8 Nonetheless, because of their insider positions,
judges may already possess or may be able to obtain information
about typical trial outcomes and going rates in particular jurisdic-
tions.9 This ability to gather comparative information about other
6. See THOMAS Gn-ovicii, DACIER KELTNER & RICHARD E. NISHErr, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
555-66 (2d ed. 2011) (describing social psychological phenomena in group decision making);
JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WisDom OF CROwDS: WHY THE MANY ARE SMARTER THAN THEl- FEW
AND How CoLLECOIVE WIS1oM SHAPES BUSINEss, ECONOMIEs, SOCIBTIES, AND NATIONS, at
xiii-xiv (2004); Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Are Twelve Heads Better Than One?, 52 LAw & CONTIEMP.
PROns. 205, 206 (1989).
7. In essence, the jury-judge contrast is between two different processing systems, a "Type 1"
or faster and intuitive type of thinking versus a "Type 2" or rational and deliberative thinking.
See Gregory Mitchell & Phillip E. Tetlock, Cognitive Style and Judging, in THlE PSYCHOLOGY OF
JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 279, 280 (David Klein & Gregory Mitchell eds., 2010); John W.
Payne & James R. Bettman, Walking with the Scarecrow: The Information-Processing Approach
to Decision Research, in BLACKWELL IHANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING 110,
125 (Derek J. Koehler & Nigel Harvey eds., 2004); Jonathan St. B. T. Evans, Dual-Processing
Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition, 59 ANN. REv. PSYCiOi. 255 (2008);
Gideon Keren & Yaacov Schul, Two Is Not Always Better Than One: A Critical Evaluation of
Two-System Theories, 4 PERSP. Psyctioi. SCI. 533, 533-34 (2009).
8. Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV.
1, 43 (2007); see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski et al., Does Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?,
84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2008).
9. See Valerie P. Hans, Judges, Juries, and Scientific Evidence, 16 J.L. & PoL'Y 19, 19-20
(2007) (describing the fact-finding advantages of judges over juries).
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cases might lessen the likelihood of judicial variability, especially com-
pared to juries who are left in the dark about so many things, includ-
ing the going rate for particular injuries and even whether the state
imposes caps or other limits on damage awards.
Other features of jury trials might promote a sense of or actual un-
certainty-the exact composition of the jury, who becomes the jury
foreman or leader, whether the jury must render a unanimous verdict,
and whether polarization or compromise will occur. The decisions of
smaller juries should also be more difficult to predict than decisions of
larger juries.10 Unlike criminal juries, which in most states and in fed-
eral trials consist of twelve persons who must reach a unanimous ver-
dict, civil jury size and decision rules vary quite a bit from state to
state. Smaller juries, and those that need only reach a majority deci-
sion, might be more unpredictable than larger unanimous decision-
making bodies." From a theoretical perspective, the awards of
smaller juries should be more variable than the awards reached by
larger juries. The law of large numbers indicates that larger groups
provide more reliable estimates of the population's judgments. Ap-
plied to jury awards, this suggests that the awards of larger juries
should be easier to predict than the awards of smaller juries.12 The
impact of jury size on actual jury awards has not been extensively
studied, but a mock jury research project by James Davis and his col-
leagues found that the awards of six-person civil juries were larger and
more variable than the awards of twelve-person civil juries.'3 Thus,
some states with particular jury configurations (for example, six-per-
son non-unanimous juries) may experience greater variability in jury
awards.
Finally, we also have to acknowledge that when a lawyer complains
about the unpredictability of juries, he or she might not be talking
about predictability at all. Instead, the lawyer might be saying that
10. See Michael J. Saks, The Smaller the Jury, the Greater the Unpredictability, 79 JI)ICATURE
263 (1996); Nicole L. Waters, Does Jury Size Matter?: A Review of the Literature 4 (report
prepared for the Administrative Office of the Courts by the National Center for State Courts
2004).
11. See Valerie P. Hans, The Power of Twelve: The Impact of Jury Size and Unanimity on Civil
Jury Decision Making, 4 Dit. L. Ruv. 1, 8 (2001); Saks, supra note 10, at 263; Michael J. Saks &
Mollie Weighner Marti, A Meta-Analysis of the Effects of Jury Size, 21 LAw & Hum. BEIAv.
451, 465 (1997); Alisa Smith & Michael J. Saks, The Case for Overturning Williams v. Florida and
the Six-Person Jury: History, Law, and Empirical Evidence, 60 FLA. L. Rev. 441, 458 (2008);
Waters, supra note 10, at 4.
12. See Waters, supra note 10, at 5.
13. See James H. Davis et al., Effects of Group Size and Procedural Influence on Consensual
Judgments of Quantity: The Example of Damage Awards and Mock Civil Juries, 73 J. PEI1soNA-
rry & Soc. Psycijoi. 703, 707-08 (1997).
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juries are unfair and reach decisions against them all too often-in
fact, all too predictably.
A. What Do We Know About Civil Jury Behavior and How
Predictable Are Jury Verdicts and Jury Awards?
A rich and continually expanding literature has explored the deter-
minants of civil jury verdicts and awards. A full presentation of this
body of scholarship is not necessary here; it has been amply covered
elsewhere.14 But in the context of the predictability of jury decisions,
it is important to summarize the key findings of this body of work on
civil jury decision making. Taken as a whole, the work reveals that
there are substantial relationships between the strength of the trial
evidence and jury verdicts, powerful linear relationships between the
severity of a plaintiff's injury and the eventual jury damage award,
and strong, predominantly linear (in logs) relationships between com-
pensatory damage awards and punitive damage awards.' 5 Further-
more, when scholars have compared the decision making of juries,
judges, and other decision makers, the overall patterns appear more
similar than different. That is, the same models and similar key vari-
ables account for both judge and jury decision making. 16 In one study,
for example, Wissler and her colleagues compared judge, jury, and
lawyer decision making about injury severity by presenting them with
a large number of scenarios describing a broad range of personal inju-
ries. They reached the following conclusion:
[T]he regression models suggest that different decisionmakers-
people with different roles in the legal system, different experience
with personal injury cases, and different demographic back-
grounds-relied on the same injury attributes in similar ways and
gave them similar relative weight when evaluating the severity of
injuries. . . . [A]ll of the regression models accounted for a large,
and similar, proportion of variance in the decisionmakers' judg-
ments of overall severity . . . .1
14. See EDIE GREENE & BRIAN H. BORNSTEIN, DETERMINING DAMAGES: TIHE PSYCHOLOGY
OIF JuRY AWARDS, at xiii (2003); NEIL VIDMAR & VALERIE P. HANS, AMERICAN JURIES: THE
VERDicr 267-338 (2007) (summarizing research on civil jury verdicts and awards); Kevin M.
Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1919 (2009); Valerie P. Hans &
Stephanie Albertson, Empirical Research and Civil Jury Reform, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1497,
1500 (2003); Neil Vidmar & Mirya Holman, The Frequency, Predictability, and Proportionality of
Jury Awards of Punitive Damages in State Courts in 2005: A New Audit, 43 SUFIFOL K U. L. REV.
855, 855-56 (2010); Roselle L. Wissler et al., Decisionmaking About General Damages: A Com-
parison of Jurors, Judges, and Lawyers, 98 Micii. L. REV. 751, 755 (1999).
15. Hans & Albertson, supra note 14, at 1509-14 (summarizing findings of collected research
on civil jury fact finding competence).
16. Id. at 1509.
17. Wissler, supra note 14, at 804.
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Additionally, the decisions of judges and juries converge with deci-
sions made by other experts such as doctors, claims adjusters, or arbi-
trators.'8 All of this suggests that jury verdicts are generally
predictable in the sense that we know what particular factors will lead
to plaintiff verdicts and substantial compensatory and punitive dam-
age awards.
At the same time, there are pockets of variability and inconsistency,
particularly when it comes to predicting the dollar value of damage
awards. In their study, Wissler and her colleagues found greater dif-
ferences across groups of decision makers in recommended money
damages.19 Furthermore, their regression models were better able to
account for injury severity judgments than for recommended damage
awards.20 In other work, Michael Saks has noted a broad pattern of
vertical equity in jury awards (that is, more serious injuries that relia-
bly result in greater awards), yet at the same time the persistence of
some horizontal inequity (that is, injuries that are comparable but that
receive differing awards). 21 Although this apparent horizontal ineq-
uity could be evidence of jury unreliability, an alternative explanation
is that even if one holds constant the overall severity of an injury, the
actual impact on a plaintiff may vary greatly depending on the context
and facts of the injury as well as the plaintiff's circumstances. 22
The fact that juries decide in groups in contrast to the individual
decision of a judge might add to the stability of jury decision mak-
ing-diverse jurors can combine their views and perspectives over
what constitutes a fair and reasonable award for a particular injury.
Some scholars argue that punitive damage awards in groups such as
juries may become more variable through a process of polarization
during group decision making, but that conclusion has been the sub-
ject of intense debate.23
18. Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights and Implica-
tions for Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103, 150 (2002); Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the Ameri-
can Civil Jury: An Empirical Perspective, 40 ARIZ. L. REv. 849, 858-59 (1998); Stephen J. Choi
& Theodore Eisenberg, Punitive Damages in Securities Arbitration: An Empirical Study, 39 J.
LEGAL S-ruo. 497 (2010).
19. See id. at 783-96.
20. See id. at 808.
21. See Michael J. Saks et al., Reducing Variability in Civil Jury Awards, 21 LAw & Hum.
Bi-iAv. 243, 243-44 (1997).
22. VIDMAR & HANS, supra note 14, at 299-300.
23. See, e.g., id. at 315-16.
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B. Sources of Jury Unpredictability Judgments:
An Empirical Analysis
Are perceptions of jury unpredictability reality-based? The exis-
tence of two sets of data-one that explores the business and insur-
ance bar's views about the predictability of juries and another that
provides national data of civil jury trial outcomes across the states-
offers an opportunity to examine some of the potential real-world
sources of perceived jury predictability and unpredictability. The first
set of data comes from the 2005 and 2006 U.S. Chamber of Commerce
state liability systems ranking studies, conducted for the U.S. Cham-
ber Institute for Legal Reform.24 The ranking studies reflect the views
of business and insurance lawyers about state liability systems and in-
clude two questions on state court juries, one focused on juries' pre-
dictability, and the other on juries' fairness. 25 The second data set is
from the Civil Justice Survey commissioned by the National Center
for State Courts (NCSC) in conjunction with the Bureau of Justice
Statistics (BJS) for the calendar year 2005, which obtained data di-
rectly from state trial courts about the frequency and outcomes of jury
trials.26 Our plan is to attempt to model the attorney ratings of the
predictability of each state's juries, using data on the number and out-
comes of jury trials in the state as independent variables.
1. Chamber of Commerce State Liability Systems Ranking Studies:
Methodology
The Chamber of Commerce's Institute for Legal Reform state lia-
bility systems ranking studies have been conducted annually, and the
survey approach and methodological details are fully described else-
where. 27 Therefore, we will only summarize the study methodology
here, relying substantially on the Chamber's own descriptions of its
approach and focusing our methodological presentation on the central
elements of interest for this project.
24. U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, 2006 U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
STATE LIABILITY RANKING STUDY 89 (2006), available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.
com/component/ilrdocs/29/all/STU.html?start=80 [hereinafter CHAMBER REPORT 2006]; U.S.
CIIAMBE.R INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, 2005 U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE STATE LIABIL-
ITY RANKING STuoY 87 (Study no. 22550, 2005), available at http://www.instituteforlegalreform.
com/component/ilrdocs/29/all/STU.html?start=120 [hereinafter CIIAMBER REPORT 2005].
25. See id.
26. Lynn Langton & Thomas H. Cohen, Civil Bench and Jury Trials in State Courts, 2005
(Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report 2009), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/
pub/pdf/cbjtsc05.pdf.
27. CIIAMBER REPORT 2006, supra note 24, at 89; CHAMBER REPORT 2005, supra note 24, at
87; see also Theodore Eisenberg, U.S. Chamber of Commerce Liability Survey: Inaccurate, Un-
fair, and Bad for Business, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 969 (2009).
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The Chamber of Commerce surveys are conducted by the survey
and market research firm Harris Interactive. The first step in each of
the survey years considered here was to draw a representative sample
of companies with annual revenues of at least $100 million, primarily
relying on IdExec.28 In the 2006 survey, the IdExec source was sup-
plemented by additional names drawn from Dun & Bradstreet and
InfoUSA.29 A letter was mailed to the general counsel at each com-
pany, providing information about the study, informing them that an
interviewer from Harris Interactive would be making contact and re-
questing their participation. 30 To achieve high respondent participa-
tion, in addition to the alert letters, multiple telephone callbacks were
made in order to reach the respondent and conduct the interview at a
convenient time for the respondent.31
For the 2005 report, 1,437 respondents participated, including 80
from insurance companies and the rest from public corporations in
other industries. 32 The proportion of interviews with insurance com-
panies represents 6% of the total sample, which is the typical repre-
sentation of insurance companies in the universe of companies with
$100 million or more in annual revenues. 33 The 2006 survey included
1,456 respondents, including 88 from insurance companies-again, 6%
of the total sample.34 Respondents from the 2005 and 2006 surveys
were experienced groups, with 18.735 and 1936 years respectively of
relevant legal experience including their jobs.37 Both 2005 and 2006
surveys were conducted employing Harris Interactive's computer-as-
sisted telephone interviewing system in which trained interviewers
called respondents and immediately input responses into the com-
puter for later analysis.38 For the 2005 report, the field dates were
November 2004 to February 2005; the 2006 field dates were November
2005 to March 2006.39
28. See CHAMBER RiEPORT 2005, supra note 24, at 84.
29. CHAMBER RiEP'oRT 2006, supra note 24, at 89.
30. Id.
31. CHAMBER REPORT 2006, supra note 24, at 90; CHAMBER Ri'roiwr 2005, supra note 24, at
85.
32. CHAMBER RE-PORT 2005, supra note 24, at 84.
33. Id.
34. CHAMBER REPORT 2006, supra note 24, at 89.
35. CHAMBER REPORT 2005, supra note 24, at 84.
36. CHAMBER RiPoRr 2006, supra note 24, at 89.
37. Id. We could not locate response rates in either the Chamber Report 2005 or the Cham-
ber Report 2006, so we cannot say what proportion of the total number of individuals who were
initially contacted actually participated in the study.
38. Id.; CHAMBER REPORT 2005, supra note 24, at 85.
39. CHAMBER REPOR-r 2006, supra note 24, at 89; CHAMBIER Riurowr 2005, supra note 24, at
85.
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2. Chamber Surveys: Elements of State Court Liability Systems
Once a qualified respondent was identified, the respondent was first
asked about his or her familiarity with a number of particular states
and then asked to identify any other states with which the respondent
was somewhat or very familiar. Respondents who were very or some-
what familiar with a state were given the opportunity to evaluate that
state's liability system. In 2005 and 2006, respondents could evaluate
up to 15 states; on average they rated 5 states in 2005 and 6 states in
2006. In 2005, respondents were asked about their views of 10 ele-
ments of a state's civil justice system, and an overall state grade was
computed from these responses. In 2006, the Chamber added two
new elements: noneconomic damages, and having and enforcing
meaningful venue rules. The 2006 survey expanded the class action
element to include "mass consolidation suits" in addition to class ac-
tion litigation.
Respondents were first asked about a variety of aspects of the state
court liability systems with which they were at least somewhat famil-
iar, including such elements as venue requirements, punitive damages,
and noneconomic damages. 4 0 Next, they were asked about their views
of juries with one item pertaining to "Juries' Predictability" and a sec-
ond item pertaining to "Juries' Fairness." 4 1 The exact wording in both
years was as follows:
Using the same scale, I'd like you to think now about the effective-
ness of some key people who implement this system.... How would
you grade [state's name, e.g. Delaware] on buries' predictability] ...
"A", "B", "C", "D", or 'F"? . . . Again, an "A" means they are
doing "an excellent job at creating a fair and reasonable litigation
environment" and an "F" means that they are doing "a failing job at
creating a fair and reasonable environment." How would you grade
[state's name, e.g. Delaware] on buries' predictability]? . . . "A",
"B", "C", "D", or "F7"?42
Similar questions about juries' fairness, judges' impartiality, and
judges' competence were also asked in this section, and the order of
items was randomly determined. 4 3
The survey graded the elements on an "A" through "F" scale." In
2005, in translating the grades to numerical values, the Chamber as-
40. CHAMBER REPORT 2006, supra note 24, at 105-08; CHAMBER REPORT 2005, supra note 24,
at 96-99.
41. CHAMBER REPORT 2006, supra note 24, at 109; CHAMBER REPORT 2005, supra note 24, at
100.
42. CHAMBER REPour 2005, supra note 24, at 100.
43. See id.
44. CHAMBER REPORT 2006, supra note 24, at 7; CHAMBER REPORT 2005, supra note 24, at 6.
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signed 4 to an A, 3 to a B, 2 to a C, 1 to a D, and 0 to an F.4 5 In 2006,
the Chamber changed the number associated with each grade, raising
the highest number to 5 for an A and the lowest number to 1 for an
F.46
3. Civil Justice Survey of State Courts 2005
The Civil Justice Survey of State Courts is a periodic survey of the
business of state courts, conducted jointly by the National Center for
State Courts (NCSC) and the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS). The
Civil Justice Survey collected data from state court clerks' offices on
tort, contract, and real property cases disposed of by trial during
2005.47
The study included state courts of general jurisdiction in a stratified
sample of 46 of the 75 most populous counties in the United States.48
In addition, the 2005 survey included coverage of smaller counties,
adding 110 counties to represent the 3,066 smaller counties not in-
cluded in the study's group of the largest counties. 49 The 2005 data
included all completed trials in the studied counties.5
The 2005 survey included an item asking whether punitive damages
had been sought in each case.51 It is important to point out that the
determination of whether punitive damages were sought was based on
case file materials and not on whether the jury actually considered
whether to award punitive damages to the plaintiff.52 Cases in which a
punitive damage award was sought in the original or an amended
complaint but later dismissed by summary judgment, for instance,
would still be coded as cases in which punitive damages were sought.
The 2005 data include 8,872 trials of an estimated total of 27,128 in
state courts in the United States in 2005, or 32.7% of total trials for
that year.53 Based on the sample design, the trials from the 46 coun-
ties are estimated to represent 10,813 general bench and civil trials
disposed of in the nation's 75 most populous counties. 5 4 Trials from
45. C1IAMBEiR REPORr 2005, supra note 24, at 6.
46. CHAMBER REPORr 2006, supra note 24, at 7. Perhaps just another example of grade
inflation?
47. Langton & Cohen, supra note 26, at 11.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 6.
52. See Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Decision to Award Punitive Damages: An Empirical
Study, 2 J. LEGAL ANAL YSIs 577 (2010).
53. U.S. DFrT OF JUSTICE, CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE CouR Is, 2005, at 13 (Study no.
23862, 2005) [hereinafter JUSTICE SURVEY].
54. Id.
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the 110 smaller counties are estimated to represent 16,315 general civil
and bench trials from outside the nation's 75 most populous
counties.5 5
III. OUR DATABASE
We developed a new database that combined results from each of
the two projects. First, for the Chamber data, we included the mean
responses to each rated element for each state in the 2005 and 2006
studies. Although the databases on which the Chamber reports are
based have not been released to the public, the Chamber reports pre-
sent detailed tables of results state by state, including average re-
sponses for those respondents who said they were at least somewhat
familiar with the state.56 For example, in the 2005 report, the 128 at-
torneys who evaluated Delaware's civil justice system rated jury pre-
dictability as 3.7; in 2006, 108 attorneys' average rating was a 3.6.57
Delaware was ranked first in 2005 among the states on the dimension
of jury predictability;58 in 2006 it dropped to fourth. 5 9 The analyses
below use the average response to the jury predictability item rather
than the ranking and rather than the response to the item about jury
fairness. The jury predictability item was highly correlated with the
jury fairness item in both years (2005: r (50) = .955, p < .0001; 2006: r
(50) = .923, p < .0001). The lawyers' jury predictability ratings across
years were also strongly correlated (see Table 1 below). Although we
undertook many of the same analyses with the element of jury fair-
ness, we do not report them here as they routinely overlapped with
the jury predictability grade.
For the data on 2005 civil jury trials, we first narrowed the Civil
Justice Survey of State Courts dataset to include only jury trials, ex-
cluding all of the trials decided by a judge. Juries decided 68% of the
26,948 general civil trials conducted in 2005.60 Because of interest in
both large and small counties, we began with the full dataset with both
large and small counties, but because of concern about the undue in-
fluence of extremely small numbers, we dropped data from any state
that did not have at least 10 jury trials during the year 2005. That left
us with a total of 30 states that reported at least 10 jury trials during
55. Id.
56. See CIlAMI3ER REPORT 2006, supra note 24, at 37-87; CHAMBER REPORT 2005, supra note
24, at 32-82.
57. CHAMBER REPORT 2006, supra note 24, at 45; CHAMBER REPORT 2005, supra note 24, at
40.
58. CHAMBER REPORT 2005, supra note 24, at 40.
59. CIAMBER REPORT 2006, supra note 24, at 45.
60. Langton & Cohen, supra note 26, at 2 tbll.
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the year 2005. In the analyses that follow, the data are weighted using
probability weights 61 to account for the differential rate of sampling of
large and small counties, as described above. The results do not mate-
rially differ if unweighted data are used.
For each state we calculated the following information: the number
of jury trials during 2005; the plaintiff win rate in these jury trials; the
number of non-zero compensatory damage awards; the means and
standard errors of non-zero compensatory damage awards; the pro-
portion of jury trials in which punitive damages were sought; the num-
ber of punitive damage awards; and the means and standard errors of
punitive damage awards. We also included the maximum compensa-
tory damage award and the maximum punitive damage award for
each state. To obtain the cleanest measure of jury behavior, we used
the unadjusted damage awards given by the jury before the judge ap-
plied any modifications to the award to adjust for plaintiff fault, insur-
ance, state caps, or other reasons.
To examine patterns in awards data, it is often necessary to trans-
form the awards so that one is able to perform sound analysis that
allows a meaningful conclusion about the relationships between vari-
ables.62 One frequent problem is that awards are often skewed, vio-
lating assumptions of some common statistical models and obscuring
relations among variables. Transformations can correct for skewness
and other problems. For example, the employment of logarithmic
transformations for compensatory and punitive damage awards in
cases in which the punitive award is at least $100 million produces a
more understandable relationship between the two.63
Inspection of the distributions of the punitive and compensatory
awards in the NCSC-BJS Civil Justice Survey showed that they suf-
fered from skewness, as expected. Therefore, we performed logarith-
mic transformations on mean and maximum compensatory and
punitive awards. These logarithmic transformations substantially im-
proved the distributions for purposes of our statistical analyses.
61. Probability weights are the reciprocal of the probability of an observation being in the
sample and can be interpreted as the number of observations in the target population that are
represented by each sampled observation. See ERIC VIrrIINGH1F T AL., RiEGRcESSION METI-
o0s IN BIosTAnsTics: LINEAR, LocISTIC, SURVIVAL, AND REPEATED MEASURES MODELs 308
(2005). The weights in our analysis are computed using the information reported in Jus-riciE
SURVEY, supra note 53, at 13.
62. See Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, The Significant Association Between Punitive
and Compensatory Damages in Blockbuster Cases: A Methodological Primer, 3 J. EmuIRICAI.
LEGAL STuD. 175, 181 n.13 (2006).
63. Id. at 187. Eisenberg and Wells contrast the usefulness of a variety of statistical techniques
for dealing with damage awards.
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We added to the database information about state rules concerning
civil jury size and civil jury decision requirements, relying on the State
Court Organization report by the NCSC.6 4 Civil jury sizes in the stud-
ied counties were six, seven, eight, or twelve.65 Decision rules are the
degree to which jurors must agree to support a verdict. The degrees
of required agreement were two-thirds in one state, three-quarters in
several states, five-sixths in several states, and unanimity in several
states.66 When there were different jury sizes and decision rules for
different types of cases (for example, smaller juries for cases with a
potential value of less than $20,000 and larger juries for higher value
cases), we used the rules that would apply to higher potential awards
or to more serious cases. The reasoning behind this is that business
and corporate counsel are typically more likely than other parties to
participate in higher stakes litigation.67
A. Results
A first look at the relationships between jury predictability judg-
ments and jury trial outcomes is provided in Table 1 below, which
displays the correlation coefficients for the attorneys' predictability
judgments and various measures of jury trial outcomes in the states.
The correlation coefficient is a measure of linear association between
two variables. 68 The coefficient always takes on values between -1
and 1. Values near zero indicate the absence of a linear association;
values between zero and 1 indicate a positive association between two
variables; and values between zero and -1 indicate a negative associa-
tion between two variables. 69
The table shows data from the states that were included in the
NCSC-BJS Civil Justice State Survey and had at least 10 jury trials.
The correlations are computed by taking the mean jury predictability
rating from the Chamber Report 2005 or the Chamber Report 2006
for each of these states as one variable and comparing it with a varia-
ble representing trial characteristics-for example, the number of jury
trials in the state in the 2005 data. The total number of states included
in each of the correlation analyses varies by the type of jury outcome
measure. Thirty states were included in calculations for the number of
64. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT ORGANIZATION 2004, at 233-37 tbl.42 (Bureau
of Justice Statistics Report 2006), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/sco04.pdf.
65. Id
66. See id.
67. See VALERIE P. HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY AND CORPORATE RESPONSI-
BILITY 180 (2000).
68. See VITFINGIIOFF ET AL., supra note 61, at 35.
69. Id.
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trials, the plaintiff-win percentage, compensatory damage measures,
and the proportion of jury trials in which punitive damages were
sought. Because fewer than thirty states had one or more cases in the
sample with punitive damages, the exact number of states included in
calculations for other punitive damage measures was lower than
thirty.
Table 1 shows that business and insurance attorneys' judgments of
jury predictability are highly correlated for 2005 and 2006, with a cor-
relation coefficient of 0.833, and also that the relationships between
these judgments and jury trial outcomes are fairly consistent across
the two years of the Chamber study. That is, the correlations are com-
parable whether one uses the 2005 Chamber results or the 2006
Chamber results.
Table 1 also shows that the number of civil jury trials (shown in the
table's third numerical row) and the percentage of civil jury trials won
by plaintiffs (shown in the fourth row) are not significantly related to
the perceived predictability of state civil juries. As the number of civil
jury trials in a state increases, the perceived predictability of juries in
the state declines, but the relationship is not statistically significant
(the probabilities are .11 for 2005 and .18 for 2006, higher than the
probability of 0.05 often used as a cutoff for designating a relationship
statistically significant). 70 The plaintiff-win percentage goes in the op-
posite direction; as the win rate in jury trials increases, the jury pre-
dictability judgments also increase somewhat, although not
significantly.
The relationships between compensatory damage variables and jury
predictability grades are all negative. Lower attorney ratings of the
predictability of juries in the state in 2005 and 2006 are associated with
higher numbers of non-zero compensatory damage awards, larger av-
erage awards, greater standard errors, and larger maximum compen-
satory damage awards in the state. However, none of these
relationships reaches a traditional level of statistical significance.
In contrast, most of the punitive damage variables are strongly and
significantly correlated with the jury predictability judgments in 2005
and 2006. First, the proportion of jury trials in which punitive dam-
ages were sought in a state is significantly related to jury predictability
grades in the state in both the 2005 and 2006 Chamber surveys. As for
actual jury trial outcomes, the number of punitive damage awards, the
average punitive damage award, and the maximum punitive damage
award in each state are significantly linked to jury predictability
70. See id. at 42.
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TABLE 1: CORRELATIONS BETWEEN BUSINESS AND CORPORATE
ATTORNEYS' JURY PREDICTABILITY GRADES AND
STATE JURY TRIAL OUTCOMES
Jury predictability grades 2005
Jury predictability grades 2006
Number of jury trials 2005
Plaintiff win percentage
Number of non-zero compensatory awards
Compensatory damage awards (log) - Mean
Compensatory damage awards - Std. error
Maximum compensatory damage award (log)
Proportion of jury trials in which punitive damages
sought
Number of punitive damage awards
Punitive damage award (log) - Mean
Punitive damage award - Std. error
Maximum punitive damage award (log)
Jury size (6, 7, 8, or 12)
Jury decision rule (.67 to 1.00)
Jury
predictability
grades 2005
1
0.833
-0.294
0.146
-0.205
-0.199
-0.010
-0.253
-0.464
-0.509
-0.628
-0.230
-0.734
-0.263
-0.221
Jury
predictability
grades 2006
0.833
1
-0.252
0.233
-0.156
-0.225
-0.075
-0.184
-0.460
-0.498
-0.639
-0.051
-0.592
-0.475
-0.036
Note: Correlations measure the relationships between business and corporate attorneys'
judgments about the predictability of juries within a state and various state jury trial measures.
Correlations reported, other than those for the maximum compensatory damage award and jury
size and decision rule, employ probability weights to reflect different sampling rates in large and
small counties. Unweighted results do not differ materially from those reported in Table 1.
Number of observations (which equals the number of states): 30 (those states with at least 10
jury trials in the sample) for the proportion of trials in which punitive damages were sought and
for all variables not including some other aspect of punitive damages; 23 (those states with at
least one punitive award in the sample) for punitive damage variables other than the mean and
standard error; 19 (those states with at least two punitive awards in the sample) for the punitive
damages mean and standard error. Correlations in bold are statistically significant at p < .05.
Sources: National Center for State Courts/Bureau of Justice Statistics Civil Justice Survey 2005;
Chamber of Commerce 2005 & 2006 Reports.
grades in both the 2005 and 2006 Chamber surveys. The standard er-
ror of the mean punitive damage award-a measure of the variability
in the estimate of the mean 7 -trends in the same direction (with
higher variability leading to lower grades for jury predictability), but
the relationship is not statistically significant.
Finally, Table 1 shows that the state's civil jury size is also linked to
the attorneys' jury predictability judgments in 2006. A similar but
non-significant relationship is apparent in the 2005 survey. Recall that
according to theory and prior research on jury decision making, larger
juries should produce more reliable reflections of the true population
mean. However, here we see the opposite of what one might expect.
71. For a definition of the standard error of the mean, see, for example, Stata Base Reference
Manual Release 11, at 270 (Statistical Software 2009).
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Attorneys rate the predictability of juries in states that require larger
juries as less, not more, predictable. The decision rule, or proportion
of jurors required for a binding verdict, is unrelated to attorneys' judg-
ments of jury predictability.
IV. FURTHER ANALYSES OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
JURY PREDICTABILITY JUDGMENTS AND JURY
TRIAL OUTCOMES
Because the punitive damage variables bore the strongest relation-
ships to the jury predictability judgments, we performed necessary
transformations and examined these relationships using scatter-plots
and superimposed on the scatter-plots the best-fitting line for these
data.72 The first two figures below show the relationship between the
proportion of 2005 cases in each state in which punitive damages were
sought and the attorney grades for jury predictability in the states in
2005 and 2006 respectively. The proportion data were first subjected
to a square root transformation. Although there are some slight dif-
ferences between the graphs for 2005 and 2006 judgments, one can
observe the similar strong downward movement of the best-fitting
lines in each one. As the proportion of cases in which punitive dam-
ages are sought in a state increases, the perceived predictability of ju-
ries in the state declines.
FIGURE 1: 2005 JURY PREDICTABILITY GRADE AND THE
PROPORTION OF CASES IN WHICH PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE
SOUGHT IN THE STATE
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72. The best-fitting lines were determined using locally weighted regression. See id. at 925.
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FIGURE 2: 2006 JURY PREDICTABILITY GRADE AND THE
PROPORTION OF CASES IN WHICH PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE
SOUGHT IN THE STATE
Z
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Proportion of cases eeking punitive damaoges ( quare root. weitghted)
.7 .8
We observe a similar relationship between the average jury punitive
damage award in each state and the jury predictability judgments for
that state (see Figures 3 and 4). As noted earlier, we use log 10 trans-
formations of values for the punitive damage award analyses because
of the skewness of the award data. Figures 3 and 4 below reveal that
as the logged value of the average punitive damage award increases,
attorney grades for jury predictability in the state decline. The same
FIGURE 3: 2005 JURY PREDICTABILITY GRADE AND THE MEAN
PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARD IN THE STATE
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FIGURE 4: 2006 JURY PREDICTABILITY GRADE AND THE MEAN
PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARD IN THE STATE
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general trend is found in both the 2005 and 2006 predictability
judgments.
In contrast to these relatively strong relationships between attor-
neys' jury predictability judgments and punitive damage measures, the
graphs (not shown) plotting the relationship between jury predictabil-
ity grades and compensatory damages measures are much flatter.73
One possibility that we wanted to explore is that especially high
compensatory and punitive damage awards by civil juries in state
courts are very salient and thus are likely to have a strong impact on
attorney evaluations. Therefore, we examined whether the maximum
compensatory and punitive damage awards in the states were linked
to attorney judgments about jury predictability in the states (see Fig-
ure 5 below). The maximum punitive damage award lines for 2005
and 2006 have a pronounced downward decline, similar to the trends
shown in Figures 1 through 4 displaying other punitive damage award
measures. In contrast, the maximum compensatory damage awards,
displayed in panels c and d of Figure 5, show basically flat lines with
slight upticks or downticks at either end.
73. Compare the strong relationships between jury predictability judgments and punitive
damage variables on the one hand, and the weaker relationships between jury predictability
judgments and compensatory damage variables on the other. See supra tbl.1.
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FIGURE 5: PANELS A THROUGH D 2005 AND 2006 JURY
PREDICTABILITY GRADES AND THE MAXIMUM PUNITIVE AND
COMPENSATORY DAMAGES AWARDS
IN THE STATE
a. 2005 Jury Predictability Grade vs. Maxiurm Punitive Award b. 2006 Jury Predictablity Grade vs. Maxirmurm Punitive Award
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Note: Lines are lowess smoothed lines; figures include only states with at least 10 jury trials.
Sources: Chamber of Commerce 2005, 2006 Reports; Bureau of Justice Statistics 2005 Data
A. Regression Analysis
Table 1 and the above figures indicate that more than one variable
is significantly associated with counsels' perceptions of jury predict-
ability. This suggests employing multiple regression analyses to ex-
plore the influence of more than one variable on perceived
predictability. 74 Because we have relatively few observations, we limit
the regression models to two explanatory variables and include as can-
didate variables only those that are statistically significant in Table 1
for the 2005 or 2006 Surveys. For counsels' perceptions of jury pre-
dictability in the 2005 Survey, the best two-variable model uses the
rate at which punitive damages were sought and the maximum puni-
tive damage award, but only the maximum award is statistically signif-
icant (p < .001). The model explains 53% of the variation in the
dependent variable. For counsels' perceptions of jury predictability in
74. Multiple linear regression is a statistical technique that quantifies the independent influ-
ence of several factors (independent variables) on the phenomenon being studied (dependent
variable). See, e.g., VrrflNGOFFla Er AL., supra note 61, at 72.
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the 2006 Survey, the best two-variable model uses the maximum puni-
tive damage award and the state's jury size as explanatory variables.
Both explanatory variables are statistically significant at p < .05. The
model explains 48% of the variation in the dependent variable.
V. DisCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Our findings suggest that the phenomenon of punitive damages, as
opposed to other dimensions of state court jury behavior, has cap-
tured the attention of the Chamber survey's business and insurance
industry attorneys and dominates its jury predictability ratings. With
the exception of the standard error of the mean punitive damage
award, all the other punitive damage data, from the proportion of
plaintiffs seeking punitive damages to the average punitive damage
judgment, are significantly and strongly related to the judgments the
attorneys make about the predictability of civil juries in the different
states. The regression analyses revealed that the maximum punitive
damage award in a state accounted for a substantial amount of the
difference between attorneys' jury predictability grades across the dif-
ferent states.
It is remarkable that punitive damage awards bear the strongest re-
lationship to jury predictability judgments. Punitive damages occur
relatively infrequently in state jury trial cases. The NCSC-BJS Civil
Justice Survey reports that punitive damages were sought in 13% of
judge and jury civil trials with plaintiff winners in 2005 and that they
were awarded in about 5% of plaintiff civil trial wins overall.75
Interestingly, Theodore Eisenberg's analysis of the Chamber of
Commerce survey data confirms the important role of punitive dam-
ages on the overall rankings of the fifty states. The Chamber reports
have routinely acknowledged that the evaluations of distinct elements
of state civil justice systems are all highly correlated. 7 6 In part, the
methodology employed, in which the respondent is asked to offer
grades for a number of elements sequentially with the same A to F
scale, may promote similarity in responses across elements. Using the
average attorney judgments for each dimension in each state, Eisen-
berg analyzed the judgments of all of the different elements evaluated
75. Langton & Cohen, supra note 26, at 6. An additional analysis limited to the nation's sev-
enty-five most populous counties showed that punitive damages were awarded in jury trials in
these counties about 5% of the time, a proportion that has not changed appreciably since the
NCSC began collecting systematic data. Id. at 10 tbl.11.
76. CHAMBER Sruny 2006, supra note 24, at 9 n.1 ("All of the key element items were highly
correlated with one another . . . ."); CHAMBER Smov 2005, supra note 24, at 7 n.1 ("All of the
key element items were highly correlated with one another ..... ).
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by attorneys in the 2008 Chamber survey, subsequent to the 2005 and
2006 surveys analyzed here.77 A factor analysis confirmed that a sin-
gle latent factor was able to account for the attorneys' judgments of
the state trial court systems.78 However, because attorney judgments
about the fairness of each state's treatment of punitive damages va-
ried more than most of the other elements, the punitive damage com-
ponent probably contributed more to the overall grade and ranking of
the states in the Chamber's 2008 survey.
The strong relationships found between jury predictability judg-
ments and actual jury trial outcomes for punitive (but not compensa-
tory) damages suggest that it is a major factor in the business and
insurance industry bar's views of civil litigation in general and jury
predictability more specifically. One possible explanation for the crit-
ical role of punitive damages in attorney judgments is that because of
the infrequency of punitive damages-as well as their prominence in
law, politics, and Chamber of Commerce advocacy efforts during the
relevant time period-punitive damage awards have higher salience to
these attorneys than other aspects of jury behavior, including the far
more common compensatory damage awards reached by juries. It is
well established that the more readily we can call an instance of a
phenomenon to mind, the more frequent we assume that it is. 79 The
continuous, vigorous efforts by industry to modify state and federal
law relating to punitive damages during the last decade, the omnipres-
ent Exxon Valdez litigation80 as it wended its way through the state
and federal appellate courts, and the U.S. Supreme Court's multiple
and high profile punitive damage decisions during this time period,81
all made punitive damages a highly visible issue for business and in-
surance. It thus makes sense that attorneys would focus on the extent
to which state laws encouraged or forbade plaintiffs to seek punitive
damages and would be more likely to notice state trial court jury de-
terminations of punitive damages, particularly if they rendered large
punitive damage awards.
77. See generally Eisenberg, supra note 27, at 969.
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Fre-
quency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 208 (1973); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 Sci. 1124, 1127 (1974).
80. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2008). An excellent summary of the Exxon
Valdez litigation may be found in Catherine M. Sharkey, The Exxon Valdez Litigation Marathon:
A Window on Punitive Damages, 7 U. Si. TIiOMAs L.J. 25 (2009).
81. In addition to the Exxon Valdez litigation, other important punitive damage decisions
during the decade include State Farm v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003), and Phillip Morris USA
v. Williams, 549 U.S. 346 (2007).
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The impact of jury size on attorney jury predictability judgments
and the relationship between jury size and the variability in jury com-
pensatory and punitive damage awards are topics that deserve further
attention. From a theoretical perspective, the decisions of larger ju-
ries should be more predictable than the decisions of smaller juries.
Nonetheless, attorneys were more apt to perceive greater jury unpre-
dictability in the states with larger civil juries. It is possible that jury
awards are more variable in these states, even when taking relevant
factors into account, such as the type of case and the severity of inju-
ries. It is also possible that these states and their jury systems differ
along other key dimensions not included in our analyses. Further in-
vestigation of how jury size affects jury decision making about dam-
ages is warranted.
